This is the trust loop. The risk owner signs the policy, every consequential action gets a permit bound to that signature and to one exact payload, and the owner checks every permit on their own machine. Nobody has to trust the model, the vendor or us.
The risk owner signs a policy a person can read: the limits, the totals per customer and per day, the bands and the named approver above the line. The numbers are a signed edition, so a change is a new version with a new signature, never a quiet edit.
Before a consequential action the agent asks for a permit for the exact payload, over MCP or one REST call. Stategram checks the running totals and answers one of three ways: a permit, a referral to the named person, or a refusal with the rule that fired.
Your gateway checks the permit before it executes: the signature, the payload, the lifetime and that it was never used before. You can run the same check yourself, offline, in about 10 ms, with nothing from us.
per permit at p99, inside the region
per permit from outside AWS, median
to verify a permit on your own machine
actions when Stategram cannot be reached
Measured on 9 and 10 October 2026 on the hosted release in Frankfurt.
A permit binds to the facts the rule read at the moment of decision: the balance, the counters and the flags. Those facts come from your own system, never from the vendor whose agent is asking.
Nothing re-runs the policy at execution. Your gateway checks the permit and executes, and it holds the newest facts, so a supplier put on hold after the permit was issued is refused there.
Next come facts your own system signs, and the signed file you already hand a vendor, so a policy can read them without an integration.
Two things: your own signature, and the hardware your policy runs on. Nothing else, and you can check both yourself.
Where your data is stored, and who processes it: the privacy policy.
Every product that keeps an agent in line decides one thing. Here are the eight options, what each decides, and the names buyers put next to ours in 2026. Then the table: the parts of the loop down the side, the options across the top.
The trust loop. The risk owner signs a human-readable policy; before each action the agent asks for a single-use permit, checked against the policy and the running totals; a named person decides above the line; every permit traces back to the owner's signature and verifies offline.
What the model is asked to do, and what it may say.
OpenAI Agents guardrails, the Claude Agent SDK, LakeraOne call, judged from the facts the caller supplies, and the rule that matched.
Aletyx (the Drools and DMN team), Camunda, OPA, Cedar, Taktile, a check in your own codeA person clicks before the action runs.
n8n human-in-the-loop, UiPath Action Center, ServiceNow supervised mode, VelatirWhich tools and data an agent may reach, with an approval gate on some tool calls.
Microsoft Agent 365 and Copilot Studio, Salesforce Agentforce, MintMCP, ComposioWho the agent is, and on whose authority it was delegated a scope.
Okta, Microsoft Entra Agent ID, DigiCert, KYXStart, VAIDWhat an agent spends from an account it holds, with a cap on that account.
Natural, Mastercard Agent Pay, Visa Intelligent Commerce, Google's AP2, LitWhat happened, afterwards, and who pays after a loss.
Langfuse, LangSmith, Arize, NSLogic, Armilla, AIUC, Munich Re's aiSureYes means the group does it as published. Partly means some products do part of it, or do it for one agent or one system only. No means nothing in the group claims it. Our reading of public materials, October 2026; corrections to [email protected].
| Stategram | Prompt and model guardrail tools | Rules engines and in-house code | Approval queue software | Agent platforms and gateways | Identity and delegation providers | Agent account and payment providers | Logging and observability tools, AI insurers | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Limits signed by the risk owner, every change a new version | Yes | No | Partly | No | Partly | No | Partly | No |
| One running total across every agent and person | Yes | No | Partly | No | Partly | No | Partly | No |
| Checked before execution, a single-use permit per action | Yes | No | Partly | Yes | Yes | Partly | Yes | No |
| A named approver above the line | Yes | No | Partly | Yes | Partly | No | No | No |
| Hardware-rooted: the hardware proves which code ran the policy | Yes | No | No | No | No | Partly | No | No |
| A record that verifies offline and the operator did not write | Yes | No | No | Partly | Partly | No | Partly | Partly |
| Covers your own books: refunds, settlements, claims, contract terms | Yes | Partly | Yes | Yes | Partly | No | No | No |
| The same rule for a person in the back office | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No |
Hardware-rooted means the permit is signed inside hardware that proves which code ran your policy, so a receipt rests on your own signature and the hardware, not on anyone's word, ours included. Live in Frankfurt since 9 October 2026; an external security audit is planned, not done. Underneath these products sit five ways a company can enforce a limit on an agent, from a prompt to a separate control layer, ranked against the six demands the rules already make: read the five ways.
Two weeks, a fixed fee, your limits and a named approver, and the method to do the next workflow yourself.
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